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A. Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore some of the major legal issues pertaining to transmission of 
digital assets on death. “Digital assets” within this chapter are defined widely and not 
exclusively to include a huge range of intangible information goods associated with the online 
or digital world: including social network profiles e.g. on Facebook, Twitter, Google + or 
Linked In; emails, tweets, databases etc; in-game virtual assets (e.g., as bought, found or built 
in worlds such as Second Life, World of Warcraft, Lineage, etc); digitised text, image, music 
or sound, such as video, film and e-book files; passwords to various accounts associated with 
provisions of digital goods and services, either as buyer, user or trader (e.g. to eBay, Amazon, 
Facebook, YouTube etc); domain names; 2D or 3D personality-related images or icons such 
as user icons on LiveJournal or avatars in Second Life; and not excluding the myriad types of 
digital assets emergent as commodities capable of being assigned worth (e.g. “zero day 
exploits” or bugs in software which antagonists can exploit3).  
In emerging legal discourse, disputes over digital assets on death can be usefully divided as 
related to either their pure economic value, or what might be called their dignitary, personal or 
non-economic value. Domain names, for example are an obvious example of an economic 
asset which may be crucial to the branding and thus the profitability of a business. In a family 
business, not only who inherits the domain name itself, but also who gets the email notifying 
of the upcoming need to re-register, may be controversial issues. Similarly many outlet 
businesses nowadays operate exclusively from eBay and, again, who inherits that account (i.e. 
the password and login), the money attached to the account, and any connected ongoing 
auctions will be a serious matter. Virtual assets in game worlds often represent the fruit of 
thousands of hours of labour (if game playing can be called labour
4
) and there is already a 
substantial ethical and legal literature around their value, sale and conditions for 
transferability
5
. Photos, blogs and text (e.g. spontaneous poems) within social network 
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profiles by celebrities – or those who die and later become famous – are likely soon to be of 
economic value, just as author’s letters and unpublished novels6 are today.  
But such assets may also be of what one might call sentimental value. Millions of photos exist 
on Flickr, Picasa, etc which are of very little value to anyone but the accountholder’s 
immediate friends and family – but to them they may be priceless. Similarly, access to the 
emails of a deceased family member may be of desperate importance to the bereaved, and this 
issue more than any has sparked public and legislative attention to the issue of digital assets, 
intermediary platforms and death (see below, sec. B, p. 6). Another crucial modern 
phenomenon is the trend towards “memorialisation” of social network profiles on Facebook 
and the like
7
; effectively turning them into shrines to the memory of the deceased, where 
friends leave last messages and other friends gather to read them. In such cases, although 
money is not (usually) the issue, emotions can run very high and conflicts develop (do the 
friends or the parents decide if the profile is memorialised? What if the profile tells people 
something about the deceased the parents would rather suppress e.g. homosexuality, atheism, 
suicide?) and the first litigation relating to access to, and possession of, social network 
profiles is also beginning to percolate through
8
.   
Finally it is worth noting that society in general as well as specific heirs, family and friends 
has an interest in the legacy of the dead; e.g. authors’ letters (or emails, or blogs) have value 
to historians, scholars and critics as well as a market value to collectors. The range of 
stakeholders involved  in digital assets cases is thus disparate and by no means limited to 
those in a contractual relationship with service providers
9
. 
In all types of cases, the legal issues around access, control, ownership and transmission are 
complex, and worse still, such answers as there are may vary considerably from legal system 
to legal system. It is important to note the law does not start here from a blank canvas. To 
some extent, existing laws will already partially regulate the issues. Almost all legal systems 
have rules relating to the transmission of property on death, under the name of wills and 
testaments law, succession, probate etc. Succession law is usually divided into what the law 
says when a will has been made by the deceased (testacy) and what happens when no will 
exists (intestacy). The law regulating the procedure to wind up the deceased’s estate – the 
ingathering and distribution of assets to heirs or legatees – is a separate branch of law again, 
usually called executry or administration. Unhelpfully, succession laws tend to be very 
localised -  e.g. the substantive laws relating to transmission of assets on death vary wildly 
even between, say, the various United States, England and Wales, and Scotland,  which are at 
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least all three common law jurisdictions (though Scotland has considerable civilian influence). 
Civilian legal systems (eg as found in the nations of Continental Europe, Latin America, 
Louisiana, Quebec and Japan) differ even further. These differences matter: in one system, the 
spouse of the deceased may inherit or have the right to occupy the family home no matter 
what a will says – in others, the will may reign triumphant. In some systems, step-children 
may inherit nothing on intestacy, while in others they may be equal to full-blood children. 
Some attempts have been made to harmonise a few aspects of succession law globally – e.g. 
as discussed below, the laws on recognition of grants of administration obtained abroad in 
relation to assets in the local jurisdiction – but very little of the basic substantive law has been 
globally harmonised. As we shall see later, this means difficult jurisdictional problems are 
likely to arise in the nature of digital assets , for example, if an English person dies in England 
but with a profile on Facebook, a company whose HQ is in California but whose servers may 
be distributed globally. We touch briefly on this issue at section E. 
The key question is how far digital assets fit well into these existing legal paradigms, complex 
as they are, and whether new law is needed. Two preliminary issues complicate the matter. 
First, in general, assets only fall into the estate of a deceased if they are “property”. Property 
law, like succession law, is a well-established and ancient branch of private law. It has also 
been annotated by more modern legal conceptions including intellectual property (IP) law, 
data protection (DP) law, privacy law and information law. Property is most often 
recognisable as to what transmits on death. It has restrictions. In most systems, not all things 
we may want, or think we own, are property, although where the line is drawn is one of the 
most difficult issues in private law. Some items cannot be owned as they belong to all of us: 
the air and the high seas are usually in this category. More relevantly to digital assets, some 
items are too evanescent to be property. The hope of a future gain – e.g. an option to buy 
future stock, held by an employee when they die – may or may not convert into an item in 
their probate inventory, depending on the legal system and the exact details. The same may 
apply to a future right to sue on behalf of the deceased if he or she was libelled or wronged or 
dismissed from employment without cause during their lifetime. In many legal systems, such 
claims are viewed as personal to the deceased and title to sue in such cases dies with the 
wronged person and will not transmit to their heirs.  
Some licences – contractual rights to use, as are commonly “sold” in relation to digital music 
or intellectual property (IP) in general  – are explicitly given only for limited periods of time - 
which may mean they expire on death (or earlier) and so do not form part of the estate of the 
deceased. This point is very relevant to inheritance of MP3s downloaded from e.g. iTunes, or 
e-books downloaded to a Kindle. Finally, some assets are so novel it is simply hard to tell if 
they can be categorised as property, even if regularly “sold” or valued,  and if so, what kind of 
property. The “zero day exploits” mentioned above may fall into this character, as might be 
on-line reputations e.g. the “karma” on Slashdot of a commenter, or a trader’s cumulative 
rating on eBay. We discuss some of these problems below, using emails and MP3s bought 
from iTunes as illustrative examples. 
The second key complication is that many important digital assets are controlled, both 
practically and legally, by intermediaries. This is true in the offline world as well sometimes – 
e.g. access to a bank account is controlled by the bank when the user dies – but it is much less 
common than in the online world. Access to Facebook profiles, for example, is entirely 
controlled by Facebook. A user cannot set up a profile there without entering a contract with 
Facebook. This contract is usually formed when a user clicks “I accept” or similar, and is 
therefore deemed to have read and accepted the terms and conditions set by Facebook. (Such 
agreements – whether known as “end user license agreements” or EULAs (as is common in 
4 
 
games and virtual worlds); or terms and conditions (T&C); or Acceptable Use and Privacy 
Policies are all basically legal contracts.) When the user dies, control of the profile is still 
effectively with Facebook. They can close or delete or memorialise the profile, according to 
their own internal rules or norms, while the heirs may not even be able to read it if they are 
not FB users, or even if they are if they were not “Friends” with the deceased (and how many 
young people have their mother, say, as a Friend on Facebook?) Legally as far as Facebook is 
concerned, the relationship between them and the user, even after death, is primarily regulated 
by contract. The contract may simply not contain any rules on what happens on death – 
Facebook do give some insight into their internal rules
10
 but many service provider contracts 
are simply blank on the matter, which may mean disputes are left to the discretion of abuse 
teams, or similar.  Even where rules do exist though, there is a patent potential for conflict on 
death between the rules of contract and the rules of succession/executry. This major problem 
was first explored in case law in the celebrated Ellsworth and Yahoo! case, discussed in full 
below at section B.  
A connected and less often aired problem is that contract rules are a matter of private 
bargaining not social policy. While inheritance laws may have evolved to try to balance the 
interests of, say, parents and spouse of the deceased, or spouse and best friend, or even society 
(e.g. ultimus haeres rules) , contract is unlikely to think about the public good or what value 
society places on family ties. This is particularly true in the context of social network or most 
online service contracts which are usually (as they say in consumer law) standard form 
contracts dictated to the user with significant imbalance of power and lack of opportunity to 
negotiate. In plain English, this mean that users rarely read the contracts they “sign” with 
online service providers and have no power to alter them even if they did; thus they are likely 
not to reflect their real wishes on death but merely what is commercially best for the service 
provider. There is often a lack of transparency as to what the service provider’s rules are, and 
a lack of consistency as to what the rules are from one service provider to another. This is 
why it is quite probable that what terms if any social network providers state about 
transmission of user accounts may well clash with the general law of succession; and that 
users are likely to have no idea what happens to their profiles etc when they die.  
Given the complexities described above, this chapter will mainly draw comparatively on the 
laws of the US and England and Wales, with a few references where relevant to EU law. In 
general as a matter of private law, succession and property laws in the EU are a matter for 
national law. Some harmonised EU law, e.g. data protection law, is however relevant. 
Similarly in the US, succession law is largely a state not federal matter.  As already noted, the 
lack of international (or often even national) harmonisation in this area is a particularly acute 
problem when talking about “globalised” or delocalised assets such as tweets or Facebook 
profiles. Another key problem is the simple novelty of the area, meaning there is a lack of 
legal precedent as well as good practice among solicitors/lawyers.  Part of the plan for future 
Edwards/Harbinja research is to provide a one-stop shop guide for users and lawyers seeking 
guidance on devolution of particular digital assets on death.  
B. What digital assets constitute property? 
As noted above, a first question is to ask if a digital asset is actually an item capable of being 
transmitted on death, i.e. does it legally constitute “property”.  This issue has recently been of 
controversy in the common law world in relation to two prevalent examples: emails, and 
songs downloaded from the iTunes (Apple) platform.  
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Emails  
In the significant recent English case, Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v Adkins
11
, Justice 
Edwards-Stuart concluded that emails could not be considered as property. The case did not 
concern transmission on death, but rather a commercial dispute between the ex-employee of a 
company, and the new owners of the company who had been successful in a hostile takeover. 
Emails sent to Adkins in his role as company employee were crucial to the company after he 
left, in order that the company could defend itself in a stock market investigation in Norway, 
and other matters; however they had been forwarded to Adkins’ private email address and 
deleted from the company server. The company therefore sought to attach the emails as the 
property of the company.  The case is clearly relevant to deciding if emails are “property” for 
any circumstance including, as here, litigation or inquiries, but also potentially, death, divorce 
or bankruptcy. Drawing on previous case law relating to the general status of information as 
property in the context of hard copy letters, Edwards-Stuart J drew a clear distinction between 
any physical container and the information it carried: 
“..there is or may be an important distinction between the physical object which 
carries the information - for example, a letter - and the information which that object 
conveys.  A letter, which consists of paper together with the ink of the writing which is 
on it, is clearly a physical object that can be owned.  However, it does not follow from 
this that the information which the letter conveys is also property that is capable of 
being the subject of a proprietary claim (for this purpose I leave aside the possibility 
of any claim arising out of copyright in respect of the contents of the letter).
12
 
Justice Edwards-Stuart reached this conclusion by hypothesising as to what would follow if 
the content of an e-mail was deemed capable in law of being property.  He saw five possible 
options: 
(1) that title to the content remains throughout with the creator (or his 
principal); 
(2) that, when an e-mail is sent, title to the content passes to the recipient (or 
his principal) - this being by analogy with the transfer of property in a 
letter when one person sends it to another; 
(3) as for (1), but that the recipient of the e-mail has a licence to use the 
content for any legitimate purpose consistent with the circumstances in 
which it was sent; 
(4) as for (2), but that the sender of the e-mail has a licence to retain the 
content and to use it for any legitimate purpose; and 
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(5) that title to the content of the message, once sent, is shared between the 
sender and the recipient and, as a logical consequence of this, is shared 
not only between them but also with all others to whom subsequently the 
message may be forwarded.
13
 
When discussing these options, the judge drew attention to the unwanted consequences which 
would necessarily follow if the information in emails was deemed “property”.  For option 
(12), where the creator of the email content retains property in it, he noted that: 
The implication of adopting option (1) is that in principle the creator of an e-mail 
would be able to assert his title to its contents against the entire world. If that were so, 
one has to ask what it would involve in practice.  It would be very strange - and far 
reaching - if the creator of an e-mail could require any recipient of it, however far 
down the chain, to delete it (this would have to be the remedy because the content of 
an e-mail is not something that one can simply return).  But if he cannot do this, what 
is the use of having this proprietary right?
14
  
For option (2), when the recipient has the property right in the email content, he argued: 
The implication of adopting option (2) is that the creator of the e-mail would cease to 
have any right in its contents from the moment he sent it. It would seem to follow from 
this that the recipient would be entitled to ask the sender (in this case the creator) of 
the e-mail to delete it. Logically, the same would apply down the line so that the only 
person entitled to the contents of a particular e-mail would be the last recipient.  
However, if the initial e-mail was sent to several recipients, some of whom forwarded 
it to others, the question of who had the title in its contents at any one time would 
become hopelessly confused.
15
  
Finally, he concluded rather sensibly: 
For all these reasons I can find no practical basis for holding that there should be 
property in the content of an e-mail, even if I thought that it was otherwise open to me 
to do so.  To the extent that people require protection against the misuse of 
information contained in e-mails, in my judgment satisfactory protection is provided 
under English law either by the equitable jurisdiction to which I have referred in 
relation to confidential information (or by contract, where there is one) or, where 
applicable, the law of copyright.  There are no compelling practical reasons that 
support the existence of a proprietary right - indeed, practical considerations militate 
against it.
16
 
Despite the sense in the judgment, and the line of English cases and other authority generally 
repelling the notion of information as property on which it draws
17
, the implications for 
transmission of emails on death may be problematic. If neither mail senders nor recipients 
have property rights in the email content, then it seems to follow that heirs could not require 
copies of, nor access to, such emails from the mail host, even supposing such copies survived 
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after death. The position in the US seems to be different, and the leading case of Ellsworth 
illustrates the hard choices involved.   
 
In the widely reported case of In Re Ellsworth
18
, Yahoo!, as webmail provider, initially 
refused to give the surviving family of a US marine killed in action the log-in rights to his 
email account. They plead their terms of service (i.e. the contract)
 
 which, they said, were 
designed to protect the privacy of the account owner by forbidding transfer of details to third 
parties on death
19
. The family argued that as his heirs, they should be able to see his emails as 
his “last words”- seeking access not only to those emails sent to them (or by them), but those 
sent by the deceased to others, as well possibly as those received by the deceased. There was a 
serious imminent danger that the emails would be lost forever if Yahoo!, according to its non-
survivorship policy, deleted the account. The judge, in a judgment of Solomon, allowed 
Yahoo! to abide by their privacy policy in that he did not order transfer of log-in and 
password, but made an order requiring Yahoo! to enable access to the deceased’s account by 
providing the family with a CD containing copies of the emails in the account. Yahoo! it 
seems also provided a paper copy
20
. 
 
This case could be interpreted in several ways. For example it might mean Yahoo! had the 
property rights in the emails themselves (meaning the copies stored on their webmail server) 
but were subjected to a court order demanding they make the information in them available, 
akin, perhaps, to an order for discovery in US litigation. This view could be justified by the 
traditional division of rights in letters, with Yahoo! owning the emails themselves, but the 
deceased, as author of the emails, owning the copyright which was then transferred to the 
heirs on death. This would then conceivably give the heirs a right to a court order so they 
could access the emails, publish them or prevent further copies being made, as would be part 
of their rights as copyright holders.
21
 Alternately it could imply a right of property accruing to 
the author/deceased alone of both the email itself and the information it contained
22
, which 
then transmitted to the heirs of the deceased (the family). It is hard to see though, on that 
interpretation, why the court would not have regarded the rights of the heirs as trumping the 
terms of a personal obligation entered into by the deceased, and ordered full access to the 
account including transfer of password. (A still third option might be that the family/heirs 
were entitled to ingather the emails simply as administrators of the estate – but there is no 
evidence for this apparent from the facts made public.) 
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Darrow and Ferrera
23
, considering the implications of the case, agree that it does not settle the 
debate over whether emails are property in US law
24
, but argue that if emails are to be 
regarded as property, both US case law and emerging service provider practice seem to prefer 
the rights of the author to property in emails over the rights of the email service provider -  
even if the terms of service, as in the Yahoo! case, appear to make contrary claims
25
. An e-
mail message is the creation of its author, and as such, should be considered the author’s 
property and the author’s rights in his e-mail should equate to rights in private hard copy 
letters. As in the English cases, in the US, it is fairly settled law that an author presumptively 
retains a copyright in physical messages authored by him, even if the physical message is sent 
to another; but the controversy here lies in whether this applies to email, and more so, whether 
when copies of emails are held by a service provider, as is the default in most webmail 
accounts, or sent to a third party recipient, ownership also transfers. Darrow and Ferrera 
hypothesise that the contractual relationship of bailment could helpfully explain the 
relationship between the account holder and service provider. Drawing analogies to the legal 
position of warehouses and safe deposit boxes, they argue that email messages are merely 
placed in the possession of the service provider for specific purposes, while the account 
holder retains full ownership of those messages. This, they conclude, defeats the argument 
that the emails become the property of the service provider. Accordingly, in the case of death, 
heirs should be able to inherit emails just as they would inherit private letters and other 
possessions of the deceased.  
 
Darrow and Ferrera do admit however that this position may need modified, given the 
principles of freedom of contract and testation, where the deceased has made it clear he does 
not want the emails to go to the heirs. This seems, slightly oddly, to prioritise what terms the 
deceased “adds” to the contract after death, over the terms imposed ab initio by the service 
provider. However this might be explained, as noted above, by consumer protection policy, 
given the lack of opportunity for the accountholder to renegotiate the terms when entering the 
contract. 
26
.  
 
It will be interesting to see if future case law clarifies the US position, especially after 
Fairstar. It is notable that Darrow and Ferrara clearly hold the view that the family would 
have been treated badly in Ellsworth if they had not received the emails, and do not really 
engage with the wider consequences of declaring information to be property, such as the 
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deleted for a certain period of time and (b) service providers should be compelled to give access to heirs on proof 
of this being the likely intention of the deceased, while (c) recommending ownership of emails not be codified 
but left to the market via the development of a range of different service provider terms. 
26
 Darrow and Ferrera also engage with the argument that passing property on death in emails to heirs may 
invade the privacy of the deceased; see further sec. F p 19 below. See also Wilkens M “Privacy and Security 
During Life, Access after Death: Are they Mutually Exclusive?” 2011 62 Hastings LJ 1037 . 
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creation of monopolies in factual information, something which intellectual property tries to 
avoid; the possibly inappropriate invoking of criminal laws of theft or destruction of property; 
and the ability to prevent disclosure of historical facts and chill freedom of expression, 
something with which privacy law already struggles
27
. 
 
Property vs License: iTunes and e-books 
In September 2012, a story toured the Internet that Bruce Willis, the Hollywood actor, had 
discovered that his “extensive library” of downloaded music and films from the apple iTunes 
store was not legally his to leave in his will
28
. Aggrieved, Willis apparently planned to fight 
Apple in court, and was “looking into ways that might allow his three daughters, Rumer, 
Scout and Tallulah, to legitimately inherit it”. The story later proved to be a hoax29, but it 
brought to public attention an issue of which most ordinary users were unaware. Apple - and 
other providers of music files, videos and e-books, such as Amazon.com -  invariably grant 
“non-transferable” licenses to use content. 30  This is nothing unexpected to a lawyer: 
intellectual property is almost always licensed on restricted terms, rather than sold to end 
users (otherwise those users could themselves license the content to sub-users, and take the 
profits from the original rightsholders). Thus for example, Amazon’s terms of use state that 
“All licenses granted to you are non-exclusive and you do not acquire any ownership rights in 
the Software or Music Content.”31 Apple similarly limits the use of digital files to Apple 
devices used by the account holder solely.
32
  
 
Crucially, since licenses grant personal rights to users, these rights end on the death of the 
user
33
 even if the contract between service provider and user is silent on the matter
34
. Thus, 
those assets are not transmissible on death nor do they form “property” in the estate of the 
deceased.
35
 In reality, this means that any provisions in a will relating to legacies of MP3s, e-
books, videos etc downloaded from commercial providers will be ineffective: an iPod can be 
                                                          
27
 Note for example the attempt of the draft EC Data Protection Regulation to balance the newly introduced 
“right to forget” with measures to protect the historical record and freedom of expression. See Recitals 53, 54, 
Art. 17, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on  the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, 2012/0011 (COD) 
28
 See Arthur C. “Bruce Willis to fight Apple over right to leave iTunes library in will”, Guardian, 3 September 
2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/sep/03/bruce-willis-apple-itunes-library  . 
29
 See Arthur C. No, Bruce Willis isn't suing Apple over iTunes rights” Guardian, at 3 September 2012 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2012/sep/03/no-apple-bruce-willis . 
30
 http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=1040616 . 
31
 Amazon MP3 Store: Terms of Use, term 5.3. 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200285010&pop-up=1  
32
 see http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/uk/terms.html#SERVICE  
33
 Connor J “Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital Assets after Death” Texas 
Tech School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-02, p. 8 
34
 See Eastham L “Funeral music”, Society for Computers and Law blog, 10 February 2012, at 
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=bp24899 , noting that the iTunes contract‘s only mention of death is in relation to 
exclusion of liability. 
35
 For US law see, e.g. Sherrin et al. (1987): “A will can only dispose of property, or an interest in property 
belonging to the testator at the time of his death, except insofar as the testator has a testamentary power of 
appointment over the property. Any disposition of property in which the testator has never had an interest or of 
property in which he had an interest at the date of his will but has since disposed of in his lifetime must fail. 
Therefore, any devolution of digital property in which a testator never had an interest in, or no longer has at the 
time of death, will not stand.” p 364 in L. McKinnon “Planning for the succession of digital assets” C.L.S.Rev., 
Volume 27, Issue 4 (2011), pp. 362–367, or per Darrow and Ferrera: “For the purposes of federal tax law, 
“[p]robate assets are those assets of the decedent, includible in the gross estate under IRC § 2033, that were held 
in his or her name at [the] time of death.” supra n 23 at p 311  
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bequeathed but not the songs on it downloaded from iTunes
36
.  The issue is increasingly not a 
trivial one: a recent UK survey by cloud hosting company Rackspace found that of 2000 
adults surveyed, 25% had more than £200 worth of films, video and music stored online, 
leading to an estimate that the value of the collective “digital inheritance” in the UK alone 
exceeds £2.3 billion
37
. Given the further prediction that by 2020 a third of all music will be 
stored online, and the rising popularity of e-books, the issue of the transferability of licensed 
IP properties on death looks set to be  a continuing controversy. 
C. Regulation by contract 
As noted already, for many significant digital assets - social network profiles, emails, virtual 
assets in games, text, music and video files - the first and primary means of regulation of 
ownership will be by contract.  Many or most user or subscriber agreements do not mention 
transmission on death at all; but as we have already seen in relation to Yahoo! and iTunes, the 
terms of the contracts may still be significant to the rights of both users and their heirs.  
 
In a brief survey of important online intermediaries in the digital assets world, what is 
immediately noticeable is that there is no single model of good practice. Instead for 
consumers there is a confusing jungle of difficult to understand terms and conditions. 
Facebook, in many ways the industry gold standard
38
, offers users options of having their 
profile deleted
39
, or memorialised after death (see Fig 1 below), as well as the opportunity to 
provide a download of the deceased’s account if prior consent has been given by the 
deceased, or if a court order is made after death, as in, most typically, probate or confirmation, 
but also possibly where law enforcement agencies become involved. 
40
 Facebook however 
still refuse to provide heirs with the login and password to access the account itself. Notably, 
                                                          
36
 Of course in reality the person who inherits the iPod may simply continue to use it and its contents. However 
this would probably form a breach of the terms of service of iTunes which could mean termination of the 
service. Eastham, supra n 30, suggests a way round this would be to leave the iPod (or other device, e.g. a 
Kindle) with a legacy attached sufficient to allow the legatee to re-purchase the contents.  
37
 See “Whose iTunes is it anyway?”, Balfour and Manson , Solicitors,  blog at http://www.balfour-
manson.co.uk/news-events/news/archive/346/whose-itunes-is-it-anyway/ . 
38
 Facebook’s procedures for deletion and memorialisation of  deceased’s accounts were improved globally 
partly as a result of a general intervention by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, adjudicating on formal 
complaints made: see  “Facebook agrees to address Privacy Commissioner’s concerns “ , 27 August 2009, at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2009/nr-c_090827_e.asp . Memorialisation also involves taking the profile out 
of public search results and prevents further login attempts (e.g. by scammers, or someone the deceased had 
shared their password with). 
39
 See “We will process certain special requests for verified immediate family members, including requests to 
remove a loved one's account. This will completely remove the timeline and all associated content from 
Facebook, so no one can view it.  For all special requests, we require verification that you are an immediate 
family member or executor. Requests will not be processed if we are unable to verify your relationship to the 
deceased.  Examples of documentation that we will accept include:  
The deceased's birth certificate.  
The deceased's death certificate.  
Proof of authority under local law that you are the lawful representative of the deceased or his/her 
estate.”  
See  https://www.facebook.com/help/265593773453448/, checked at 28 December 2012 : 
See also : “In order to protect the privacy of the deceased person, we cannot provide login information for the 
account. However, once it has been memorialized, we take measures to secure the account.”    At 
https://www.facebook.com/help/359046244166395/ . 
40
 Facebook assert at https://www.facebook.com/help/265593773453448/ (checked at 28 December 2012): “We 
will provide the estate of the deceased with a download of the account’s data if prior consent is obtained from or 
decreed by the deceased, or mandated by law.” See further comment by Carroll E. “What happens to your 
Facebook account when you die?” 7 February 2012 at http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2012/02/what-happens-
to-your-facebook-account-when-you-die/  
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this advice to heirs or family is not contained within the terms and conditions of the Facebook 
contract itself, but merely the “Help” section, and so is arguably not binding on Facebook or 
enforceable by families or heirs, but merely a statement of good practice. It is also somewhat 
difficult for non-legal users to find. 
 
 
Fig 1: Facebook’s memorialisation request.41 
 
 
Facebook at least provide a useful selection of post-mortem remedies. Twitter by contrast 
only generally allows deactivation of the deceased’s user account. Like Facebook, they 
explicitly exclude the possibility of providing login information to heirs to access the account 
of the deceased, leaving only discretionary possibilities of access to the content: “In the event 
of the death of a Twitter user, we can work with a person authorized to act on the behalf of the 
estate or with a verified immediate family member of the deceased to have an account 
deactivated. Please note: We are unable to provide login information for the account to 
anyone regardless of his or her relationship to the deceased.” 42  
 
Similarly, as we have seen, Yahoo! (whose policies are also shared by Flickr) also refuse to 
pass on logins and passwords to accounts to heirs. 
43
 Google too appears only to contemplate 
passing on the contents of a Gmail account to the deceased’s heirs, rather than passing login 
details, and even that only in exceptional circumstances
44
. Microsoft Hotmail on the other 
                                                          
41
 Available at https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/?id=305593649477238 at 28 December 2012. 
42
See https://support.twitter.com/groups/33-report-abuse-or-policy-violations/topics/148-policy-
information/articles/87894-how-to-contact-twitter-about-a-deceased-user . 
43
 See discussion above of Yahoo!’s terms of service and the Ellsworth case.  
44
 “If an individual has passed away and you need access to the contents of his or her email account, in rare cases 
we may be able to provide the Gmail account content to an authorized representative of the deceased user. We 
extend our condolences and appreciate your patience and understanding throughout this process.” 
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=14300   
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hand appear willing to offer access even to the administrators of estates of incapax, but not 
deceased, users
45
. Thus among webmail providers and social networks, a norm seems to be 
emerging of  discretionary access to content in the accounts of deceased users, but no formal 
right to this, and express prohibition of transfer of account login details (which would allow 
family or friends to, e.g. carry on posting new content on the site, or to add new Friends).  
 
Another key contractual area, of particular importance in online games or virtual worlds 
prominently featuring User Generated Content (UGC), is the ownership of assets created in 
these games or via these platforms. As noted above, these assets often have considerable 
value in the “real world” as well as sentimental value. As already noted, if the user has no 
property rights in assets, they a priori cannot be transmitted to heirs on death. Blizzard, the 
World of Warcraft provider, explicitly excludes any property rights of users in assets created 
or traded in the game, as well as forbidding transfers of accounts.
46
 By contrast, Linden Labs, 
provider of the virtual world Second Life, gives users relatively extensive rights in content 
created by users therein.
47
 Mazzone notes that in line with these policies, Linden Labs also 
allow for in game assets to be transferred and bequeathed on death
48
. Looking beyond virtual 
worlds, Instagram, recently bought by Facebook, a photo sharing site, caused Internet protests 
when they appeared to change their terms of service in December 2012 to acquire ownership 
of photos stored on their site by users. Fairly swiftly, the change (whose legal implications 
were in any case disputed) was reversed
49
. Interestingly, Google, some of whose services 
allow the submission of original content (e.g. home-made videos to YouTube) explicitly and 
very plainly disclaim any rights in the IP therein
50
. 
                                                          
45
 See n 98 of Mazzone, supra n 8. 
46
 “All rights and title in and to the Service (including without limitation any user accounts, titles, computer 
code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, 
animations, sounds, musical compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral rights, any related 
documentation, “applets,” transcripts of the chat rooms, character profile information, recordings of games) are 
owned by Blizzard or its licensors.” See Terms of Use Agreement,   last updated August 22, 2012 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html. “Blizzard does not recognize the transfer of World of 
Warcraft Accounts or BNET Accounts (each an “Account”). You may not purchase, sell, gift or trade any 
Account, or offer to purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, and any such attempt shall be null and void. 
Blizzard owns, has licensed, or otherwise has rights to all of the content that appears in the Game. You agree that 
you have no right or title in or to any such content, including without limitation the virtual goods or currency 
appearing or originating in the Game, or any other attributes associated with any Account. Blizzard does not 
recognize any purported transfers of virtual property executed outside of the Game, or the purported sale, gift or 
trade in the “real world” of anything that appears or originates in the Game. Accordingly, you may not sell in-
game items or currency for “real” money, or exchange those items or currency for value outside of the Game.” 
47
 Second Life Terms of Service, December 15, 2010, title 7. See especially the right to retain title to all 
intellectual property brought into the game, the right to delete all copies of your content from the game, and most 
importantly, “7.6 Linden Lab owns Intellectual Property Rights in and to the Service, except all User Content”, 
See http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php?lang=en-US and commentary in Vacca supra n 5; A. B. Steinberg 
‘For Sale--One Level 5 Barbarian for 94,800 Won: The International Effects of Virtual Property and the Legality 
of Its Ownership’ 37 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 381 2008-2009; J. Gong ‘Defining and Addressing Virtual Property 
in International Treaties’ 17 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 101 2011 
48
 Mazzone, supra n 8, citing  Linden Lab Official: Death and Other Worries Outside Second Life, SECOND 
LIFE WIKI, at 
http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Linden_Lab_Official:Death_and_other_worries_outside_Second_Life     
49
 See Holpuch A. “Instagram reassures users over terms of service after massive outcry” Guardian, 18 
December 2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/18/instagram-issues-statement-terms-of-
service . 
50
 Google terms of service, last modified 1 March 2012 at http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ . “Your 
content in our services. Some of our Services allow you to submit content. You retain ownership of any 
intellectual property rights that you hold in that content. In short, what belongs to you stays yours.”   Note the 
YouTube terms of service modify this to require the user to grant a license to YouTube. YouTube terms of 
service, last modified 9 June 2010, 7.2. (The license terms are described in section 8).  
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Of course as seen in the Ellsworth case, contractual terms are not always the last word, and 
may be struck down as unconscionable or unreasonable when between consumers and 
businesses, as well as trumped by court orders e.g. in executry. How are the upcoming 
inevitable conflicts between terms of service, and court orders to be resolved in any 
predictable fashion? Given the norm of non-transferability of account access details, it may 
not be ethical for estate planners or lawyers to simply advise their client to prepare a will that 
passes on usernames and passwords, a commonly recommended strategy (nor is it ideal from 
a security point of view during life).  Darrow and Ferrera assert that digital assets should 
generally fall into the “gross estate” of a deceased51, and therefore be considered “probate 
assets that [are] subject to the same inheritability rules as other probate assets.” but do not 
really attack head-on the difficulties of a conflict between terms of service and court orders
52
.  
The issue is crucial as in some jurisdictions, accessing an account contrary to the terms of 
service may be seen as unauthorised access, hacking or similar crimes
53
.  Lamm, a US estate 
planning attorney, argues that even where an executor has the authority of the court to access 
the deceased’s assets, he may still not be authorised to access the account under the Terms of 
Service contract,  and any such attempt may be construed as “unauthorised access” under 
criminal law.
54
 Such breach of terms of service might also trigger the service provider to close 
the account, thus destroying the virtual assets.  In addition, the US Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act 1986 prevents a service provider from disclosing stored 
communications unless a court order is made.
55
 In a recent case, a US court refused to grant 
access to family to details in the Facebook records of the deceased, based on the protection 
provided by this Act.
56
  
 
By contrast, in England and Scotland, it is thought more likely to be assumed that a court 
order for probate or confirmation takes precedence over any lifetime contractual terms 
restricting access. Guidance might be drawn here from practice relating to executors or 
administrators ingathering the contents of bank accounts (both high street and online) where 
longstanding procedures exist to  ease distribution of the estate even if only the deceased or 
perhaps his spouse or partner had the contractual right to access before death
57
 . Finally it is 
worth noting that Facebook’s Memorialisation Request (above, Fig 1) grants authority to a 
selection of family and associates of the deceased which may not match the preferential list of 
executors in intestacy in every legal jurisdiction (certainly not in Scotland, for example
58
), nor 
                                                          
51
 The Internal Revenue Code defines the “gross estate” as “the value at the time of [decedent’s] death of all 
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.” Darrow and Ferrera, supra n 23. 
52
 Darrow and Ferrera,  supra note 23, at note 151. 
53
 See for example in the UK, the Computer Misuse Act s 1; in the US, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 
54
   Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, § 1030(a)(2) 
55
 See Kulesza A “What Happens to Your Facebook Account When You Die?”, February 3, 2012,  at 
http://blogs.lawyers.com/2012/02/what-happens-to-facebook-account-when-you-die/ . 
56
 See In re Request for order requiring Facebook, inc. to produce documents and things, Case No: C 12-80171 
LHK (PSG), 9/20/201, and see further below at sec E p 16.   
57
 For example, the general principle in Scotland is that the executor acquires the same title as the deceased had 
to ingather the entire estate including both tangible property, heritable and moveable,  and debts.  See eg Gretton 
GL and Steven AJM Property, Trusts and Succession (Tottel, 2009), paras 25.45ff.  Note however Wilkens 
(supra n 26) account of US executry practice, where she claims ingathering electronic bank accounts and similar 
financial information is extremely difficult for executors in the US because of the privacy safeguards imposed by 
inter alia the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  She points as a result 
to a defensive and routinised attitude by financial institutions and service providers who veer on the side of 
privacy for fear of regulatory breach.  We return to this point when discussing post mortem privacy below at sec 
F. 
58
 See Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 as amended. 
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any named executor in a will. This too may be fertile ground for conflicts in executry courts 
in future years. 
 
D. Tailored legislation  
 
The United States of America, or more precisely, some of its states, have been the most active 
nations in legislating to regulate transmission of digital assets on death. As noted above, 
succession and property fall within the state rather than federal jurisdiction in the US. In the 
UK, by contrast, there seems as yet neither statute nor case law in this area.  
 
So far, six US states have attempted to regulate the area, starting from 2005. These states are 
the following: Connecticut (2005 law, mandating that e-mail providers should provide copies 
of all e-mails to the executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate)59, Indiana (2007 law, 
requiring “any person who electronically stores the documents or information of another 
person” to “provide to the personal representative of the estate of a deceased person, who was 
domiciled in Indiana at the time of the person’s death, access to or copies of any documents or 
information of the deceased person stored electronically by the custodian.”)60, Rhode Island 
(2007 law, referring to e-mail accounts only, as with the Connecticut statute)
61
, Oklahoma 
(2010 law, referring to access to accounts on any social networking website, any 
microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service websites)
62
, Idaho 
(2011 law, based on the Oklahoma law, referring as well to accounts on any social networking 
website, any microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service website)
63
, 
Nebraska (2012 bill proposal, text of provisions based on Oklahoma and Idaho laws)
64
. We 
will probably soon witness other states enacting similar laws, based on the quoted examples. 
At the moment, however, in other states the law would depend on the conflict between 
contract law and court orders made in executry as discussed above.
65
 
 
It is obvious from this brief overview of US legislation that state coverage is very patchy and 
that not all the digital assets are included therein; some of the more economically significant 
assets : e.g. domain names, eBay or Amazon accounts, iTunes collections, gaming accounts 
etc cannot be subsumed under the definitions in these laws. In general these laws seem to 
have been inspired by the publicity around the Ellsworth case and similar controversies and 
resemble “moral panic” laws in being partial and responsive, rather than comprehensive and 
future-proofed. Some laws, eg, the Oklahoma statute, explicitly grant the executor power only 
“where otherwise authorized.” It is not always clear what would result if service providers 
challenged efforts to apply the law where it appeared to violate terms of service. There might 
also be jurisdictional clashes where the law of the  state where the deceased died domiciled or 
resident was not the same as the law governing the service provider contract.
66
  
 
                                                          
59
 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a. 
60
 Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1. 
61
 Rhode Island General Laws Chapter 33-27 
62
 “The executor or administrator of an estate shall have the power, where otherwise authorized, to take control 
of, conduct, continue, or terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social networking website, any 
microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service websites.“ 58 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 269 
63
 Idaho Statutes § 15-3-715(28) and § 15-5-424(3)(z) 
64
 See “Nebraska is Latest State to Address Digital Legacy”, February 20, 2012,  at 
http://www.deathanddigitallegacy.com/2012/02/20/nebraska-is-latest-state-to-address-digital-legacy/  
65
 see e.g.  Connor supra n 33 
66
 Darrow and Ferrera supra n 23 p 297  ; see section E below. 
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The answer to this patchwork coverage and possible conflicts of law clashes may be 
harmonisation within the US. In July 2012 the US Uniform Law Commission formed the 
Drafting Committee on Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets.
67
  The goal of the Committee is to 
draft a free-standing act and/or amendments to Uniform Law Commission acts, such as the 
Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code, the Uniform Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Act, and the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, that will vest fiduciaries with at 
least the authority to manage and distribute, copy or delete, and access digital assets. While 
this initiative is welcome, it is to be hoped a new model law will not cookie-cut  the 
provisions from one of the existing statutes  but make an attempt to consider the full range of 
digital assets as well as clarifying possible conflicts between contract and executry law, and  
between heirs, family and friends. 
 
E. Jurisdiction, applicable law and digital assets 
 
As noted above, jurisdiction and applicable law are likely to be significant problems in 
succession issues involving digital assets. In terms of jurisdiction in succession, a court’s 
authority, depending on local laws,  may be based on the the situs of the asset within the 
jurisdiction, as well sometimes as the domicile/habitual residence of the deceased, or choice 
of forum provision in any will
68
. Similarly, when a court seeks to determine what law applies 
to the devolution of a particular digital asset, it may be crucial if it is regarded as fitting into 
categories such as movables or immovable, tangible or intangible, personal or real property 
etc. It may seem axiomatic that digital assets are moveable; but there has already been some 
categorisation of virtual spaces as “land” where tortious trespass can take place in a 
controversial run of US cases
69
. Similarly, many users regard “land” in Second Life as more 
akin to real-world land than intellectual property. 
 
Taking an example, what happens if an English domiciled, and married,  player of Second 
Life (owned by Linden Lab) dies intestate leaving substantial in-game assets, including a 
magic shield worth $1000 and virtual “land” worth $10,000 70 and his English executor tries 
to ingather the estate? The English courts will accept jurisdiction where there is good reason 
which has been interpreted to include on grounds of the last domicile of the deceased
71
. 
However in terms of applicable law, under English common law, succession to the movables 
of a person who dies intestate will be governed by the law of his domicile at the date of his 
death. The succession to the immovables of a person who dies intestate will be governed by 
the law of the state in which the immovable are situated
72
.  The Second Life terms of service 
meanwhile state that any disputes: “shall be governed by the laws of the State of California 
                                                          
67
 At the US Uniform Law Commission 2012 Annual Meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, July 13-19 2012, see 
http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=QR%20Issue%2012%20%3E%20New%20Committees  
68
 See generally Anton Private International Law (W.Green/SULI, 3
rd
 edn, 2011), ch 23; Clarkson and Hill eds,  
Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws(2nd edn , 2002)  p 509, saying that the English courts are primarily prepared to 
appoint an executor as personal representative where the deceased has left property in England but may also do 
so if other good reasons exist eg testator died domiciled in England.  
69
 Ticketmaster Corp., et al. v. Tickets.com, Inc No CV 99-7654, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12987 dt (CD Cal 27 
March 2000), eBay v Bidder’s Edge Inc 100 F Supp 2d 1058 (ND Cal 2000), Intel Corp. v. Hamidi 30 Cal. 4th 
1342 (2003), or commentary in Lemley M.A. “Place and Cyberspace” CLR, Vol. 91 (2003), 521, Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=349760 
70
 Or the equivalent in Linden Dollars, which are a tradeable currency: see discussion at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Second_Life where the Second Life economy was valued at $567m in 
2009. 
71
 See Jaffey, supra n 68. 
72
 Ibid at 519, nn 151 and 152. 
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without regard to conflict of law principles or the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods. Further, you and Linden Lab agree to submit to the exclusive 
jurisdiction and venue of the courts located in the City and County of San Francisco, 
California”73.  
 
This latter clause leaves a patent conflict between the English and Californian courts in 
relation to jurisdiction
74
; and even if this can be settled, a possible dispute over whether 
English or Californian law applies to the devolution of both the sword and the virtual land. 
Since California is a state with, inter alia, rules relating to community of property between 
married persons
75
 very different from English law, this could raise serious difficulties. Such 
problems beset international succession disputes, and are not insuperable: but it is highly 
unlikely either the average game player or amateur executor or even family solicitor would 
know how to handle them. Nor is it clear if the games player could avoid these difficulties by 
making a will (and it should be remembered that most young people in any case die intestate, 
according to various country statistics
76
). 
 
In testate succession, attempts have been made to achieve international harmonisation in some 
respects. For example, the Hague Convention 1961 on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the 
Form of Testamentary Dispositions has simplified the issue of what formalities a will must 
meet before it can be recognised by a foreign court. The Convention was ratified in the UK by 
the implementation of the Wills Act 1963 and came into force on 5 January 1964. The US, 
however, has not signed this Convention. At EU level, a Regulation on Jurisdiction and 
Applicable Law has harmonised various matters, and created a European Certificate of 
Succession.
77
 The Regulation comes into force from August 2015. The Regulation, like the 
Hague Convention, simplifies procedures in recognising foreign wills and succession 
instruments, but does not deal with substantial issues such as what assets are property that can 
be bequeathed
78
 .These are matters normally seen as reserved to domestic jurisdictions and 
thus defy harmonisation.  
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Finally, a real not hypothetical recent case in California, In re request for order requiring 
Facebook, Inc. to produce documents and things
79
, illustrates the complexities that may arise 
in cases regarding different jurisdictions and digital assets, in civil litigation generally, not just 
executry. On December 20, 2008, Sahar Daftary died after falling from the twelfth floor of an 
apartment building located in Manchester, England. Members of her family disputed that 
Sahar had committed suicide and believed that her Facebook account contained critical 
evidence showing her actual state of mind in the days leading up to her death. Facebook 
refused to grant access to the account to the family without court authorisation and so the 
family initiated a request to subpoena the records in the Californian courts, where Facebook is 
based. The court found that the US Stored Communications Act
80
 prevents a US service 
provider from disclosing stored communications in civil proceedings as part of basic privacy 
law
81
. The interests protected by the US statute extend to a foreign citizen, deceased in this 
case, and there was no duty to provide stored communications for the purpose of the foreign 
proceedings, when access would not have been granted for domestic ones. The Court held: “It 
would be odd, to put it mildly, to grant discovery related to foreign proceedings but not those 
taking place in the United States.” The court, interestingly, refused to rule on whether 
Facebook could legitimately disclose the records to the family voluntarily, leaving both the 
social network and the family in an unfortunate state of uncertainty. 
 
F. Rights of heirs after death vs rights of deceased: “post mortem privacy” 
Both the US cases surveyed above – Ellsworth and In re Facebook – involve what may be 
called the “post mortem privacy” argument – the notion that the dead are entitled to keep their 
secrets after death and that this may trump the rights (if any) of the family or heirs to access or 
take possession of their profiles, records etc after death. This argument is particularly 
interesting for (a) illustrating conflicts between property rights and privacy rights and (b) 
raising crucial differences between legal systems, already noted,  as to whether  rights 
“personal” to deceased survive death or not. We discuss post-mortem privacy as our final 
topic.  
Post-mortem privacy is not a recognised term of art in general succession or even privacy 
literature. It is however emerging as a topic of general concern
82
. Post-mortem privacy may 
be conceived narrowly within Europe as protection of a deceased’s personal data in terms of 
the EC Data Protection Directive; or more broadly, in a global context, as preserving his or 
her reputation, dignity, integrity or memory.  
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European privacy law enshrines the concept of protection of “personal data”, which is defined 
in art 2 of the current EC Data Protection Directive (DPD)
83
 as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject')”. Such identification can be direct (e.g. 
a name or address) or indirect (eg connection of a subscriber’s name to an IP address). A 
strong set of rights are given by DP law to data subjects, including the right to prevent the 
transfer or sale of personal data without grounds (including consent) and rights to access and 
correct personal data held by others. DP laws are implemented by each member state of the 
EU and are roughly harmonised though significant differences still persist in implementation. 
By contrast, no such omnibus rules protecting personal data exist in the US, although various 
sectoral sets of privacy rules make up some of the gap
84
.   
Does the personal data of decedents attract protection under DP law? This is a controversial 
matter, involving issues of whether personal data is property or merely involves a liability 
regime for misuse. The DPD does not, as currently drafted
85
, explicitly require protection of 
the deceased´s data in any context. Thus currently, the overwhelming majority of the 27 EC 
DP regimes do not protect decedents` personal data. However as the Directive sets only a 
minimum not maximum standard, it is still open to member states to introduce some kind of  
post-mortem privacy protection, and some have chosen to do so.
86
  
 
In Bulgaria, the law states that “In the event of death of the natural person his/her rights shall 
be exercised by his/her heirs.”87; while in Estonia, their Data Protection Act88, s 12 states: 
“The consent of a data subject shall be valid during the life of the data subject and thirty years 
after the death of the data subject, unless the data subject has decided otherwise.” Section 13 
furthermore entitles certain family members to consent to processing of personal data after the 
death of data subject, but not more than 30 years after death.
89
. But by contrast, the Swedish 
Data Protection Act explicitly excludes post mortem personal data protection by defining 
personal data as “all kinds of information that directly or indirectly may be referable to a 
natural person who is alive.”90 Similarly, the UK Data Protection Act defines personal data as 
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“data which relate to a living individual”91. Other member states also predominantly use the 
term “natural person”, which is understood generally as meaning a person having legal 
capacity, starting with birth and ending with death.
92
 
 
Should personal data of decedents be protected? As with the discussion earlier on emails as 
property, there are good arguments for and against. At a conceptual level, in common law 
systems, there is a long recognised principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona  
(personal causes of actions die with the person, e.g. defamation claims,  breach of confidence 
claims)
 93
. On the other hand many EU nations are of the civilian tradition which has 
historically been more inclined to recognise the persistence of rights to protect reputation after 
death, and especially a creator’s interest (or rather his family’s) in protecting the integrity of 
their creation after death. For example in the German Mephisto
94
 and Marlene Dietrich 
cases
95
, the courts granted protection for both the non-commercial (dignity, privacy) and 
commercial interests of deceased (the use of name, voice, or image for financial gain)
96
. 
However, the courts of France, another major civilian jurisdiction, took a different position. In 
the case of SA Editions Plon v. Mitterand
97, Court of Cassation held that “the right to act in 
respect of privacy disappears when the person in question, the sole holder of that right, dies”. 
Looking at policy-based arguments, some argue that the living are entitled to shape their 
image and protect their dignity after death;  that, following the principle of freedom of 
testation, the wishes of the deceased should be respected;  and that protecting the privacy of 
the deceased also protects the mourning family. Alternately however, it might be said that the 
privacy of the dead may conflict with the wishes and needs of the living – we have already 
seen this argument in the context of cases like Ellsworth, where the deceased might have 
wished to hide e.g. his sexuality or moral choices from his family after death.  Another strong 
argument is that post-mortem privacy might impede freedom of expression, and further a 
“PR” society. Archives and the historical record would be less complete if personal data were 
cloaked by privacy post mortem.  Society has a right to know about its history and what art 
and literature its deceased citizens have left as a matter of public interest
98
.  
Finally giving rights in personal data to the deceased creates practical problems. Who is to 
give the consent of the deceased to use of their personal data –what heirs or representatives, 
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and for how long? Are the heirs required to give consent as they wish or only in accordance 
with what they think the wishes of the deceased were? How can conflicts between different 
family members be resolved, or family members and partners or friends?  How can service 
providers know what requests are genuine and which backed by law? At present service 
providers, as noted above, request a variety of information from relatives, from newspaper 
obituaries to death certificates to mere knowledge of the deceased’s email address. Formal 
recognition of protection of the personal data of the dead would surely require a more 
rigorous approach to be taken
99
. 
As noted above, some US commentators have already been driven by the Ellsworth case to 
speculate on whether the wishes of the living or the privacy of the deceased should take 
priority. Wilkens describes privacy and access as “two ships crashing in the night” and argues 
that online service providers, especially financial institutions, will hesitate to provide essential 
records and assets to executors for fear of breaking regulations safeguarding financial privacy, 
such as the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). Darrow and Ferrera, by contrast, probably 
represent the majority American academic view in regarding privacy rights as ceasing upon 
death and so presenting no opposition to the will of the living. They note that private letters, 
diaries, and photographs can already be inherited and may contain equally private information 
concerning the deceased.
100
 However in these cases, it may be argued that the deceased either 
chose to allow (if a will was made) or at least did not explicitly forbid (by failing to make a 
will and dying intestate) the transmission of the data. Where the most acute difficulties are 
likely to arise are where the deceased has made it clear before death that they value their 
privacy (much as Nabokov made it plain he did not wish his unfinished novels to be published 
after his death
101
).  
 
Darrow and Ferrera do toy with the idea that on general freedom of contract principles, “it 
may still be possible to create a contractual right of privacy which is effective to protect 
private information of deceased individuals.” But, even if wishes for post mortem privacy had 
been incorporated into a service provider contract, or a will, it seems unlikely a court would 
truly prefer the wishes of the dead to those of the living, where only the living remain to 
suffer emotional distress. Such conflicts recall disputes over organ donation requests and 
family wishes eg when deceased dies with Kidney Donor card but family wish him to be 
buried intact ; in England, statute and medical practice still effectively resolve these conflicts  
in favour of the living family’s wishes rather than the deceased, but in Scotland the law has 
now been changed to reflect the alternative position
102
. Finally the possibility exists that even 
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willing disclosure of emails left by a deceased may also invade the privacy of unwilling third 
parties; here the practical difficulties of post mortem consent for service providers become 
even more profound.  
 
G. Some interim solutions 
 
What solutions exist for the problems of post mortem transmission of digital assets and post 
mortem privacy? This brief review of legal issues cannot in the space allowed be 
comprehensive on future possible solutions. A number of suggestions however come up again 
and again in the literature, and are here arranged according to Lessig’s famous range of 
modalities of regulation
103
. 
 
a. LAW: Harmonise international rules to create a requirement on service providers to 
give access to digital accounts and assets to properly accredited representatives of the 
deceased. As noted above, while tailored legislation is beginning to emerge in the US, 
in a domain of intangible delocalised assets, piecemeal disparate local legislation is 
highly unsuitable. It is time the matter was brought to the table of the major treaty-
making bodies, notably the Hague Conference on Private International Law, as well 
conceivably as the EU, the Council of Europe, the Art 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, the Internet Governance Forum and even the ITU. In a highly controversial 
area, one place to start might be with a simple uniform rule that a deceased’s emails 
(and other digital accounts and assets?) cannot be deleted until a certain time after 
death, so that assets are not destroyed before relatives find out what to do, and if 
necessary, what court orders can be obtained. 
b. LAW /MARKET/CODE: Require service providers to offer users an easy to 
understand and sufficiently prominent opportunity to make an election as to what 
happens to their digital assets after they die. In the most obvious analogy, Facebook 
continually offer users opportunities to alter settings concerning their privacy, the 
layout of their profile, what appears on the timeline, etc. Although the default and 
design of these settings and their impact on privacy are themselves controversial
104
, 
there seems no good reason why a pre-mortem choice could not be added, eg allowing 
users to appoint a “Facebook executor”105after death, and/or to choose between (say) 
preservation, memorialisation or deletion of their profile themselves.  This would at 
least overcome the prevalent problem of users, especially the young, dying without 
giving any evidence as to their post mortem privacy wishes. Ideally, market 
competition would lead to this solution; but this is probably unlikely, given the 
monopolistic nature of network oriented industries such as social networks, user 
ignorance and the likely stiff opposition from service providers, who know that 
reminding their customers of their mortality is hardly the most cheerful sight on a 
social networking site. One key issue will be if a default is set, and if so, what.  
Mazzone suggests interestingly that the default setting should bear community 
interests in mind (eg the surviving family, the public interest) while the user’s explicit 
non-default choices could be tailored purely to their wishes. 
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c. CODE: Using digital wills/trusts etc. A number of digital services have emerged in 
recent years to try, in the main absence of legal assistance, to solve the problems of 
transmission of digital assets. as digital assets. These include “password lockers”, 
online will drafters and post-mortem emailers, as well as various hybrids (e.g. Asset 
Lock, Entrustet, LifeEnsured, Death Switch, My Digital Executor, Final Fling). 
Unsurprisingly, given the terrain surveyed above, these are not themselves a foolproof 
solution. Passing on a password may be a breach of terms of service, a criminal 
offence or inconsistent with the law of succession/executry (e.g. engaging conflicts 
with who is the heir on intestacy or under a written will, requirements of will 
formalities, jurisdiction issues etc.) Other concerns include the stability and longevity 
of the market and individual services, security, identity theft etc.). However, with the 
assistance of law (as in suggestions a. and b. above), these code solutions could, 
arguably, be appropriate for the online environment and enable more efficient and 
accessible transmission of certain digital assets. 
d. NORMS: Education and training. It goes without saying that better public and indeed, 
lawyer, and policymaker, awareness of some of these issues would help resolve them 
before disputes arise. Service providers should make their policies on death clearer 
and more transparent (or indeed, create some if none exist); train their response or 
abuse teams to deal with these issues; and offer help to users. Providing information to 
children and young people should be a priority. Call centre and helpline staff at online 
banks, ISPs, webmail service providers etc are also likely to be in need of appropriate 
training and resourcing. 
 
However as in all aspects of Internet and social networking culture, education is unlikely to be 
the complete answer, nor is the market, and it is the authors’ view that regulation (and 
possibly transnational legislation), further than mere “nudging” of the market, is likely to 
become necessary sooner rather than later. With successive generations increasingly banking 
online, creating online, communicating online and playing online, the problem of death and 
digital assets, like death itself, is not likely to go away any time soon. 
